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Software Patents Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f):
Should Congress Amend § 271 to Harmonize
Protection Between Tangible and Intangible
Inventions?
by ROBERT A. MCFARLANE* AND TIMOTHY V. FISHER**
I. Introduction
United States patent law defines patent infringement to include
the unauthorized making, using, selling, or offering for sale of a
patented invention within the United States as well as the
unauthorized importation of a patented invention into the country.
Notwithstanding the territorial limits of these infringement
provisions, courts have been asked through the years to settle difficult
questions regarding liability for potential patent infringement based
on conduct committed in whole or in part outside of the United
States.2
* Mr. McFarlane is a litigation partner in the San Francisco office of Carroll,
Burdick & McDonough LLP where he specializes in patent and intellectual property
litigation, trade secret matters, and technology-related complex commercial cases. Prior
to joining his current firm, Mr. McFarlane practiced for more than 12 years at Townsend
and Townsend and Crew LLP where he was also a litigation partner. Mr. McFarlane
teaches patent law as an adjunct professor at Golden Gate University School of Law. He
received his J.D. from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law in 1994
and his B.A.S. in Industrial Engineering and Political Science from Stanford University in
1990. The views and opinions contained in this article do not necessarily reflect the
opinions of Carroll, Burdick & McDonough LLP, any of its individual attorneys, or its
clients.
** Mr. Fisher is a J.D. Candidate at the University of California Hastings College of
the Law, 2011, and Editor-in-Chief of the Hastings Science & Technology Law Journal,
2010-2011. Mr. Fisher received his B.S. and M.S. in Electrical Engineering from
Worcester Polytechnic Institute in 2002 and 2004, respectively, and was an electrical
design engineer in the field of scientific instruments.
1. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2010).
2. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (AT&T H);
Deepsouth Packing Co., Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972) (Deepsouth);
[183]
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Congress has also acted upon occasion to clarify the potential for
liability to be imposed for domestic patent infringement based on
actions taken, or at least completed, outside of the United States.
For example, Congress added § 271(f) to the patent statutes in 1984
to close a loophole that allowed a competitor to entirely avoid
infringement liability if it largely manufactured a patented device
within the United States, but intentionally exported the device so that
a final, insubstantial assembly step could be completed abroad.
Today the same loophole closed by the passage of § 271(f) manifests
itself in the realm of patented software because of two recent
decisions issued by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit that
limit protections under § 271(f) to apparatus patents and their
physical components. Specifically, the Supreme Court held in
Microsoft v. AT&T that a software "master disk"' is not a
"component" for purposes of §271(f), and, therefore, exporting a
master disk from the United States for duplication and installation
onto computers abroad is not infringement. Subsequently, the en
banc Federal Circuit held in Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude that
271(f) does not apply to process patents at all.' The end result of
these two decisions is that holders of patents covering apparatus and
other tangible inventions have a remedy against parties in the United
States who export tangible components of the patented articles while
holders of software or process patents do not.
This article explores this asymmetry in patent protection, its
origin, and its implications for inventions in the digital and software
fields. The article then considers whether § 271 should be revised,
and examines two options for doing so: 1) adding a statutory
provision to protect software against unauthorized exportation, and
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 576 F.3d 1348 (2009) (en banc), cert.
denied, 78 U.S.L.W. 3322 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2010) (No. 09-596) (Cardiac Pacemakers).
3. See, e.g., § 271(f); H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. § 101 (1982) (enacted).
4. Id.
5. AT&TIH, 550 U.S. 437; Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d 1348.
6. A software master disk or "golden master" is a disk sent by the software creator
to the manufacturer for duplication. The duplicates are installation disks, which are the
copies of the software that are actually installed on computers. See A T&T II, 550 U.S. at
459-60.
7. AT&T HI, 550 U.S. at 449 ("Abstract software code is an idea without physical
embodiment, and as such, it does not match § 271(f)'s categorization: 'components'
amenable to 'combination.").
8. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365 ("In sum, the language of Section 271(f), its
legislative history, and the provision's place in the overall statutory scheme all support the
conclusion that Section 271(f) does not apply to method patents.").
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2) simply repealing § 271(f) in light of new intellectual property
treaties that arguably render § 271(f) redundant.
II. Historical Background
A. A Loophole in the Patent Statutes: Avoiding Infringement Liability
by Performing an Insubstantial Assembly Step Abroad
1. Deepsouth Packing Co.: the Supreme Court Endorses the Loophole
In 1972, the Supreme Court held that a would-be patent infringer
could avoid liability by simply exporting a patented article in
disassembled form.9 In that case, the district court held Deepsouth
Packing Co. liable for infringing patents owned by Laitram
Corporation."' After being permanently enjoined from making or
selling machines covered by Laitram's patents, Deepsouth requested
that the district court modify the injunction to permit Deepsouth to
sell unassembled units to a customer in Brazil, where it would be
assembled into the infringing device.n The district court held that a
combination patent protects only the combination, not the
unassembled parts, and ruled that the injunction did not prohibit the
sale of the unassembled product to a foreign entity.'
The Fifth Circuit reversed on appeal and directed the district
court to withdraw its modifications of the injunction." The circuit
court noted that the district court correctly applied the rule adopted
by the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits (that a machine is not
"made" in the United States until it is fully assembled),'4 but refused
to adopt that rule to disputes in the Fifth Circuit.'5 Rather than adopt
what it called the "artificial, technical construction" of the word
"makes" in § 271(a)," the Fifth Circuit ruled that "when all the parts
9. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 532.
10. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 301 F. Supp. 1037 (E.D. La. 1969).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 929.
13. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1971).
14. Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626 (2nd Cir. 1935) (Andrea I); Cold
Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 235 F.2d 224 (3rd Cir. 1956)
(following Andrea 1); Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link Belt Co., 371 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1966)
(following Andrea 1).
15. Laitram Corp., 443 F.2d at 938.
16. § 271(a) states that: "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent."
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of a patented machine are produced in the United States and, in
merely minor respects, the machine is to be finally assembled for its
intended use in a foreign country, that machine is 'made' within the
United States."'
The Supreme Court reversed on a 5-4 vote." The majority
focused on the question of manufacture: "did Deepsouth 'make' (and
then sell) something cognizable under the patent law as the patented
invention, or did it 'make' (and then sell) something that fell short of
infringement?"'9 Citing "a line of decisions so firmly embedded in
our patent laws as to be unassailable absent a congressional recasting
of the statute,"2 () the Court held that what was made and sold
domestically was something less than the claimed invention, and
therefore no infringement occurred 1
In addition to its well-settled precedent, the Court cited three
basic judicial principles to support its opinion. First, the Court
described the legislative history of the patent statute, and noted that
its enactment left the patent laws unmodified in light of the case law
at the time.2  Second, the Court cited the nation's "antipathy to
monopoly." 23 Finally, the Court referred to what is generally called
the presumption against extraterritoriality - that the patent laws are
- * *24limited to domestic application.
2. Deepsouth Dissent
Deepsouth was narrowly decided, with four justices dissenting.25
In the dissent, Justice Blackmun first focused on the statutory
17. Laitram Corp., 443 F.2d at 938.
18. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 532.
19. Id. at 527.
20. Id. at 528-29 (citing Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320
U.S. 680, 684 (1944) ("[A] patent on a combination is a patent on the assembled or
functioning whole, not on the separate parts."); Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking
Machine Co., 213 U.S. 301 (1909) ("One element is not the combination. Indeed, all of
the elements are not. To be that - to be identical with the invention of the combination -
they must be united by the same operative law."); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacements Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344 (1961) ("[I]f anything is settled in patent law, it is
that the combination patent covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and that
no element, separately viewed, is within the grant.")).
21. Id. at 532.
22. Id. at 530 (referring to the Patent Act of 1952).
23. Deepsouth, 460 U.S. at 530 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 et seq.
(1966)).
24. Id. at 531.
25. Id. at 532.
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language, particularly Congressional use of the word "making." 26 He
wrote, "I do not see how one can escape the conclusion that the
Deepsouth machine was made in the United States," noting that by
Deepsouth's own representations the machine was shipped with every
necessary part and could be assembled in less than an hour.
Justice Blackmun then took issue with the majority's application
of Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea (Andrea I).28 Andrea I, like
Deepsouth, involved exportation of a disassembled patented article.29
Andrea I was seriously undermined by a subsequent opinion in the
same litigation (Andrea II)3o such that Judge Swan, the author of
Andrea I, lamented in his dissent to Andrea II that his prior decision
had been overruled.
Andrea I held that the defendants had not infringed the
plaintiff's patents because they had not manufactured or sold a
complete combination.32 Andrea II, which was decided on a more
complete factual record than Andrea I, found infringement in two
forms. The first was substantial assembly: "Where the elements of an
invention are thus sold in substantially unified and combined form,
infringement may not be avoided by a separation or division of parts
which leaves to the purchaser the simple task of integration."3  The
second was testing fully assembled units: "The tests were made to see
if [the radios] were marketable - a commercial and hence an
infringing use."34 The holding of Andrea II reads on the facts of
Deepsouth, but the Deepsouth majority did not make clear why they
applied Andrea I instead.
3. Deepsouth's Vunerability
The effective reversal of Andrea I by Andrea II presented a two-
fold problem for the majority opinion in Deepsouth: First, it
undermined somewhat the "unassailable" precedent cited by the
26. Id. at 533.
27. Id.
28. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 533.
29. Andrea I, 79 F.2d at 627. Andrea was exporting a radio receiver covered by the
plaintiff's patent. He attempted to avoid infringement by shipping the radios with their
vacuum tubes included, but removed from their sockets.
30. Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 90 F.2d 612 (2d. Cir. 1937) (Andrea II).
31. Id. at 615 (Swan, J., dissenting in part).
32. Andrea 1, 79 F.2d at 629.
33. Andrea HI, 90 F.2d at 613 ("The purchaser to connect the tubes needs only insert it
in the socket. No adjustment is required; no screw or nut need be tightened.").
34. Id. at 614.
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majority. The Deepsouth Court cited three previous Supreme Court
decisions for the notion that a combination patent protects only the
combination. However, none of the cases cited discussed
exportation or substantial assembly. Rather, Deepsouth cited
Andrea I as applying those cases to the case of exportation of a
substantial assembly.7 Andrea II, on the other hand, found that the
substantial assembly that had occurred - substantial assembly
equivalent to the facts of Deepsouth - was sufficient for a finding of
infringement.
Second, the silence of the patent statute's legislative history with
regard to Andrea I was understood as an implicit codification of its
ruling.3 However, the majority offered no reason why Congress
implicitly adopted the rule of Andrea I but not the arguably more
viable rule of Andrea II. Both cases were decided more than a
decade prior to the Patent Act of 1952, which was the law governing
Deepsouth.4
The two other legs of the Deepsouth majority opinion - antipathy
towards monopoly and the presumption against extraterritoriality -
were also subject to reasoned criticism. First, the Court focused on a
"false conflict of policies" between the monopolistic nature of the
patent system and the pro-competitive policy of a free capitalist
society.4' There is no question that a patent is a government-
35. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 528 (citing Mercoid v. Minneapolis-Honeywell, 320 U.S. at
684 ("[A] patent on a combination is a patent on the assembled or functioning whole, not
on the separate parts."); Leeds v. Victor, 213 U.S. at 320 ("To be that - to be identical with
the invention of the combination - [the elements] must be united by the same operative
law."); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top, 365 U.S. at 344 ("[I]f anything is settled in patent
law, it is that the combination patent covers only the totality of the elements in the claim
and that no element, separately viewed, is within the grant.")).
36. Id. (citing Leeds v. Victor, 213 U.S. 301 (holding, based on the rule that an
American patent expires on the same date as its identical foreign counterpart, that an
American patent for a combination does not expire when a foreign patent identical to less
than the whole of the American patented combination expires); Mercoid v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell, 320 U.S. at 684 (holding that selling a single element of a combination patent,
no matter how essential to the operation of the combination, is not infringement); Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top, 365 U.S. at 344 (holding that repair of a patented
combination through the replacement of a spent, unpatented element does not constitute
infringing reconstruction)).
37. Id. at 529.
38. Andrea H, 90 F.2d at 613.
39. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 530.
40. Id.
41. Charles M. Kerr, Operable Versus Substantial Assembly of Patented
Combinations: A Critique of Deepsouth v. Laitram, 26 STAN. L. REV. 893, 895-96 (1974).
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sponsored monopoly on an invention.42  Conversely, the patent
statutes limit the extent of the monopoly by imposing patent term
limits43 and disclosure requirements. 44 Thus, Congress set the balance
between monopoly and competition and courts should seek to
effectuate the patent statutes rather than re-weighing already settled
*45policy considerations.
Second, the Court relied on a Congressional intent to restrain
extraterritorial application of the patent laws for unassembled
articles.46 The Deepsouth majority reasoned that the issue was one of
domestic manufacture, i.e., "did Deepsouth 'make' (and then sell)
something cognizable under the patent law as the patented
invention?"47 The majority did not, however, adequately address the
obvious question of statutory interpretation: If operable assembly in
the United States constitutes infringement, then why not substantial
assembly? Drawing a line between the two and justifying it in terms
of their extraterritorial effect seems inappropriate when the
41
extraterritorial effect is the same in either case.
B. Closing the Loophole: the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984
1. Congress Enacts 35 U.S. C. § 271(f)
Congress addressed the perceived inequity of Deepsouth by
passing the Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984,49 which included a
new subsection, 271(f), providing that:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied
in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the
components of a patented invention, where such components
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries;") (emphasis added).
43. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (West 2010).
44. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2010).
45. Kerr, supra note 41, at 896.
46. Id. at 916.
47. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 527.
48. Kerr, supra note 41, at 896.
49. H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. § 101 (1984) ("The ... change made by section 101 will
prevent copiers from avoiding U.S. patents by supplying components of a patented
product in this country so that the assembly of the components may be completed abroad.
This proposal responds to the United States Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), concerning the need for a legislative
solution to close a loophole in patent law.").
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are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to
actively induce the combination of such components outside of
the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if
such combination occurred within the United States, shall be
liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied
in or from the United States any component of a patented
invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use
in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such
component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that
such component is so made or adapted and intending that such
component will be combined outside of the United States in a
manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an
infringer.
These paragraphs were specifically drawn from the separate
provisions of § 271 that create liability for indirect infringement'
Specifically, paragraph (1) parallels § 271(b),5 which governs
inducement, and paragraph (2) parallels § 271(c),5 which governs
contributory infringement. Liability for either type of indirect
infringement requires an act of direct infringement in the United
States,54 but liability under § 271(f) applies when equivalent activity
occurs abroad." Thus § 271 (c) has been used as a guide for how to
apply the provisions of § 271(f).
50. § 271(f).
51. Patent Law Amendments Act § 101.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) ("Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.").
53. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) ("Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be
liable as a contributory infringer.").
54. See, e.g., Aro Mfg., 365 U.S. at 341-342 ("[T]here can be no contributory
infringement in the absence of a direct infringement."); Alloc, Inc. v. U.S. In'tl Trade
Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[D]irect infringement ... is a prerequisite
to indirect infringement.")
55. §271 (f).
56. See Ormco Corp. v. Align Techs, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1074 (C.D. Cal. 2009)
(interpreting the standard for determining "substantial noninfringing use" under §
271 (f)(2) in light of the case law interpreting the same phrase in § 271 (c) based on the
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2. Initial Applications of § 271(f)
Case law interpreting § 271(f) gradually developed as courts
applied the new statute to diverse classifications of inventions.5 The
provision was first applied in a relatively straightforward manner to
mechanical inventions," and later to inventions directed to chemical"
and drug compounds." Interestingly, early cases applying section
271(f) held that it did not protect intangibles such as patented designs
or information. Aerogroup International, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks,
Ltd. held that § 271(f) did not extend to design patents, reasoning that
design patents have no "component parts" to which § 271(f) would
apply." Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc. held that mere information
was not an export sufficient to trigger § 271(f).6 2  The current
controversy regarding the application of section 271(f) arose when
courts started applying the provision to inventions related to
software.
"normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the
same act are intended to have the same meaning." (citing Agro Dutch Indus. Ltd. v.
United States, 508 F.3d 1024, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2007))).
57. See Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The Application of Domestic Patent Law to
Exported Software: 35 U.S.C. 271(f), 25 U. PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 557, 567 (2004).
58. See Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 229 U.S.P.Q. 81 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 1986)
(applying § 271(f) to a patent for drill bits for oil exploration); Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v.
Fred Ostermann GmbH, 668 F. Supp. 812, 820-21 (S.D.NY. 1987), aff'd, BIC Leisure
Prods. v. Windsurfing Int'l, 1 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying § 271(f) to a patent for a
windsurfing board); T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587 (N.D. Okla. 1989)
(applying § 271(f) to a patent for an instrument for measuring the internal geometry of
pipelines).
59. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320 (D. Del. 1999) ("There
is no limitation in the statute excluding protection for chemical composition inventions.").
60. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 2001 WL 1263299
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that § 271(f) applied to chemical patents in the context of drug
patents), aff'd, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
61. Aerogroup Int'l, 955 F. Supp. at 232 (holding that the language of § 271(f)(1) "by
its terms does not apply to the patent at issue here, which has no 'component parts' but is
rather a design patent for a shoe sole.").
62. Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1118 ("'Supplying or causing to be supplied' in § 271(f)
clearly refers to physical supply of components, not simply to the supply of instructions or
corporate oversight. In other words, although Analog may be giving instructions from the
United States that cause the components of the patented invention to be supplied, it is
undisputed that those components are not being supplied in or from the United States.").
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C. The Difficulties of Applying § 271(f) to Software
Courts have had difficulty analyzing the application of section
271(f) to software patents." Practitioners have struggled to fit
software patents into one of the enumerated categories of patentable
subject matter listed in § 101,64 and several types of patent claims have
evolved to bring software inventions within the statutory scope."
Software patents have been issued with claims drafted in both
apparatus and process claims. Apparatus claims in this field are
typically drawn to describe an invention in which the software is
defined as configuring a computer into a special purpose machine;
e.g., an off-the-shelf PC running the software."6 Process claims
covering software inventions, on the other hand, are typically drafted
to recite the individual steps executed by a novel computer program.67
Courts and the USPTO have faced two difficulties in applying
§ 271(f) to software patents: First, whether software may be
considered a "component" of a patented apparatus such that
exporting the software falls under § 271(f)." Second, whether a
patented process can have "components," and thus whether a process
patent can ever be within the purview of § 271(f)." On both questions
the law has made at least one complete reversal and narrowed the
scope of patent protection.
63. Compare AT&T II, 550 U.S. at 453 (holding that "the very components supplied
from the United States, and not copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability when combined
abroad to form the patented invention at issue," thereby reversing A T& T Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (AT&T I)), with Eolas Techs., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that "'components,'
according to section 271 (f)(1), includes software code on golden master disks").
64. § 101 (Providing that patentable subject matters includes processes, machines,
manufactures, and compositions of matter.). For a history of the early controversy
surrounding the patentability of software inventions, see Frederick Kyle Longhofer,
Patentability of Computer Programs, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 125, 127-37 (1982).
65. JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION § 14:14.2
(Practicing Law Institute, 2d ed. 2009) (describing five claim types: apparatus, method,
software product, signal, and Beauregard).
66. Id. at § 14:14.2[A].
67. Id. at § 14:14.2[B].
68. See, e.g., Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1338 (Fed. Circ.
2005).
69. See, e.g., Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
70. See, e.g., Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365 (overruling Union Carbide, 425
F.3d 1366); AT&T II, 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (reversing A T& TI, 414 F.3d 1366).
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1. Eolas and AT&T I: Is Software a 'Component' of an Apparatus?
Initially, courts unambiguously held that software was indeed a
"component" for purposes of infringement under § 271(f).71
Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp. involved allegations that
Microsoft's NetMeeting software infringed Imagexpo's patent related
to video and teleconferencing over the internet.72 Microsoft typically
exported its software programs on master disks that then served as
templates for duplication. The copies thus made were what were
ultimately installed and executed on computers. Relying on
Aerogroup, which held that § 271(f) did not apply to design patents,
and Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., which held that a method patents
had no "components" for purposes of § 271(f), Microsoft argued that
it should not be liable under § 271(f) for foreign software sales
because software, like a patented design or process, is intangible and
therefore cannot be a "component."' Nevertheless the court
concluded that the "'golden master' and the electronic codes supplied
by Microsoft to its overseas representatives constitute[d]
'components' under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)," and permitted Imagexpo to
seek damages on units of NetMeeting made outside of the United
States. 6 The jury eventually awarded Imagexpo $62.3 million.
a. Eolas Technologies v. Microsoft Corp.
The Federal Circuit quickly adopted Imagexpo's holding in Eolas
Technologies v. Microsoft Corp.78 Eolas was an instructive and
ground-breaking decision governing application of § 271(f) to
software patents that relied on numerous authorities from diverse
71. See generally Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550 (E.D. Va.
2003) (denying Microsoft's motion in limine to bar Imagexpo from seeking damages on
units of NetMeeting made outside the United States).
72. Id. at 551.
73. Aerogroup Int'l, 955 F. Supp. at 232, discussed supra at note 61.
74. Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding
that that "[w]hile it is true that any process involves the use of physical objects, this alone
is not enough to bring a method patent within the purview of § 271(f), ... We conclude
that plaintiffs' patent has no 'components' for purposes of § 271 (f).").
75. Imagexpo, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 552-53.
76. Id. at 553.
77. Susan Hansen, Making Microsoft Pay: This Howrey Simon team won $60 million
from Microsoft in the Second largest IP verdict in 2003, 4/1/04 IP L. & BuS. 26 (2004). In a
post-verdict settlement, Microsoft agreed to pay $60 million, but was permitted to
continue selling NetMeeting.
78. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Circ. 2005).
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sources to support its decision." Eolas alleged that Microsoft's
Internet Explorer incorporated Eolas's invention for automatically
invoking external applications to open objects embedded in a
webpage.... The narrow issue before the Court was "whether software
code made in the United States and exported abroad is a 'component
of a patented invention' under section 271(f)."" However, the case
involved both an apparatus claim and a process claim, and the
Federal Circuit took the opportunity to issue a sweeping decision that
broadly governed the application of § 271(f):
This statutory language did not limit section 271(f) to patented
"machines" or patented "physical structures." Rather every
form of invention eligible for patenting falls within the
protection of section 271(f). By the same token, the statute did
not limit section 271(f) to "machine" components or "structural
or physical" components. Rather every component of every
form of invention deserves the protection of section 271(f).82
Thus, the Federal Circuit unambiguously extended protections
under §271(f) to process claims. In doing so, the Federal Circuit
arguably ignored its previous ruling in Standard Havens," which held
that § 271(f) did not apply to process patents. Nevertheless, Eolas
carried the day. Shortly after the Court's decision in Eolas, AT&T I
(discussed in the next section) extended application of § 271(f) to
software master disks that are duplicated overseas,84 and Union
Carbide (also discussed below) explicitly adopted the application of
§ 271(f) to process patents."5
b. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.
AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. (AT&T I), applied § 271(f) not
just to software disks exported for installation on computers abroad,
but to "golden master" disks that were never themselves installed on
79. Indeed, the Federal Circuit cited principles of statutory construction, legislative
history, international treaty, its own precedent, and scholarly publications. See id. at 1339-
40.
80. Id. at 1328.
81. Id. at 1338.
82. Id. at 1339.
83. Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1991), discussed infra in Section (II)(C)(2).
84. AT&T I, 414 F.3d at 1366.
85. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1380.
86. AT&T 1, 414 F.3d 1366.
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computers, but rather were duplicated abroad. AT&T alleged that
Microsoft's Windows operating system incorporated speech codecs
that infringed AT&T's patent." The AT&T I court, in interpreting
the word "supplies" in the statute," held that "for software
'components,' the act of copying is subsumed in the act of 'supplying,'
such that sending a single copy abroad with the intent that it be
replicated invokes § 271(f) liability for those foreign made copies.""
Judge Raders's dissent disputed the majority's merger of copying and
supplying; however, the majority maintained that to do otherwise
would "emasculate § 271(f) for software inventions."9' In fact, the
majority believed that even an electronic transmission of software
could result in liability.9 2
2. Union Carbide: Do processes have 'components'?
Long before the dispute regarding Microsoft's golden master
disks, the Federal Circuit initially ruled that process patents were
outside the purview of § 271(f). Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v.
Gencor Indus., Inc. held that § 271(f) was not implicated by a sale to a
foreign customer of an apparatus - in this case a drum for making
asphalt - even though the apparatus was specifically designed to
perform the patented process. That rule was followed by
87. "Codec" is short for "coder / decoder," which is software that converts speech
signal into a digital signal, and then converts it back such that it sounds like the original.
88. AT&T I, 414 F.3d at 1368.
89. § 271(f) ("Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied . .
90. AT&T I, 414 F.3d at 1370.
91. Id. at 1370 n.2.
92. Id. at 1371 ("[W]hether software is sent abroad via electronic transmission or
shipped abroad on a 'golden master' disk is a distinction without a difference for the
purposes of § 271(f) liability. Liability under § 271(f) is not premised on the mode of
exportation, but rather the fact of exportation."). Two years later, the Supreme Court
reversed A T&TI in A T&T II (550 U.S. at 459, discussed in infra Section (III)(A)), but not
before the Federal Circuit extended § 271(f) even further to include the exportation of
unpatented components used to practice patented processes in Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at
1380.
93. Standard Havens, 953 F.2d at 1374.
6 -MCFARLANE -SHOUJLDCONGRESSAMEND§271- MAY 13- FISHEREDITS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)5/14/2010 9:30:13 AM
196 HASTINGS SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:2
94
subsequent district court cases prior to being contradicted by the
Federal Circuit decision in Union Carbide v. Shell Oil."
a. Union Carbide v. Shell Oil
The Federal Circuit reversed course in 2005 and held that
§ 271(f) did indeed cover process patents.6 Union Carbide involved
an appeal over an accounting of damages for Shell's infringement of
Union Carbide's patented process for producing ethylene oxide (a
chemical used to make polyester) using improved catalysts.97 The
district court awarded damages for direct infringement based on
Shell's use of the catalysts in making ethylene oxide, and indirect
infringement based on sales of the catalysts to third parties." The
district court refused, however, to award damages for the exportation
of the catalysts, ruling instead that § 271(f) damages were not
available for process claims."
The Federal Circuit reversed and held that a catalyst necessary
for performing a patented process was a "component" of that process
for purposes of § 2 7 1 (f)."on The ruling was based on its recent decision
in Eolas,"or which suggested that § 271(f) protection extended to any
type of component, tangible or otherwise, of both machine and
process patents."0 As described above, Eolas concerned infringement
of both process and product claims, so its extension of § 271(f) to
process claims could have been considered dictum. Union Carbide,
however, explicitly adopted the component-of-a-process rule, but
94. Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (holding that that "[w]hile it is true that any process
involves the use of physical objects, this alone is not enough to bring a method patent
within the purview of § 271(f) . . . . We conclude that plaintiffs' patent has no
'components' for purposes of § 271(f)."); Synaptic Pharm. Corp. v. MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265
F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (D.N.J. 2002) (following the lead of other courts in holding that §
271 (f) "does not protect against the foreign use of process patents.").
95. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1380. The opposite results of these two cases are
striking under Federal Circuit procedure. Decisions issued by three-judge panels
constitute binding precedent on later three-judge panels unless and until the prior decision
is overturned en banc. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Newell Cos. v. Kenney Manufacturing Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Jacobs
Wind Electric Co. v. Florida Dept. of Transportation, 919 F.2d 726, 728 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1369.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 425 F.3d at 1379.
101. Discussed supra in Section (II)(C)(1)(a).
102. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1379.
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surprisingly cited neither Standard Havens nor Enpat, cases that
contradicted its central holding.13
3. Controversy Immediately Followed Eolas, AT&T I, and Union
Carbide
Reactions to the Eolas - A T& T I - Union Carbide trilogy ranged
from confusion104 to contempt"" to a call for the outright repeal of
§ 271(f).1 06 Even within the Federal Circuit there seemed to be some
disagreement as to the cross-border activities that could constitute
infringement. Judge Rader, who expounded on the Manifest Destiny
of § 271(f) in Eolas,107 dissented in AT&TI on the grounds that
Microsoft should only be held liable for each master disk exported,
but not for the copies made overseas."os Some of this reaction may
have stemmed from the immensity of the damages awarded in Eolas:
$521 million including $333 million based on foreign sales, which at
the time stood as the second largest monetary judgment ever
rendered in a U.S. patent infringement suit." However, within a
matter of months Judge Rader broadened the sweep of § 271(f) once
again in Union Carbide, and effectively doubled the damages by
applying §271(f) in an extraterritorial manner.no
103. Id.
104. Denise W. DeFranco & Adrienne N. Smith, Technology and the Global
Economy: Progress Challenges the Federal Circuit to Define the Extraterritorial Scope of
U.S. Patent Law, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 373, 397 (2006) (cataloging a list of unanswered questions
regarding the extraterritorial application of § 271).
105. Harold C. Wegner, Microsoft Extraterritoriality: "Mutiny . . . Heresy", 25
BIOTECH. L. REP. 659, 673 (2006) ("The judicial activism manifested in the Eolas - AT&T
- Carbide trilogy has created an untenable situation of intra-circuit balkanization of case
law - a case of 'mutiny . . . heresy [and] illegal' actions in disregard of controlling
precedent." (citing Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (Rich, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc of panel opinion, 970
F.2d 834 (1992))).
106. James R. Farrand, Territoriality and Incentives Under the Patent Laws:
Overreaching Harms U.S. Economic and Technological Interests, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1215, 1291 (2006).
107. Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1339 ("[E]very component of every form of invention deserves
the protection of section 271(f).").
108. AT&T , 414 F.3d at 1373 (Rader, J., dissenting) ("This court today determines
that supplying a single 'component' of a patented invention from the United States gives
rise to endless liability in the United States under § 271(f) for products manufactured
entirely abroad.").
109. Paul Morico & Thomas Morrow, All Grown Up: a $521 Million Verdict Signals
Adulthood for Business Method and Software Patents, IP LAW & BUSINESS Nov. 1, 2003,
at 23.
110. See Farrand, supra note 106 at 1253.
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Four of the Federal Circuit Judges dissented from the denial of
rehearing en banc in Union Carbide, and three wrote a separate
opinion."' The dissent argued that the majority decision in Union
Carbide violated both the statutory scheme of § 271 and the court's
own precedent. They noted that § 271(f) was based on § 271(c),
which clearly distinguishes between "a component of a patented
machine, manufacture, combination or composition" and a
"material ... for use in practicing a patented process." 112 Congress
thus recognized the distinction and purposely limited the protection
of § 271(f) to "components" in the § 271(c) sense; i.e., not materials
for use in practicing a patented process." The dissent also noted to
no avail that the majority holding was directly contrary to Standard
Havens. 114
Scholars and practitioners did not respond positively to the
Federal Circuit's Union Carbide decision. One professor believed
that the Court's application of § 271(f) was inappropriate, and that
the proper vehicle for protection of American patentees was strong
enforcement of the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"),"5 whose
purpose is to set minimum standards for patent protection and to ease
the filing of patents in foreign countries."' He also pointed out that
TRIPs does not mandate protection akin to the anomalous § 271(f)
and that no other country has enacted such a provision."7 Another
prominent attorney called for repeal of § 271(f) altogether, citing its
"perverse incentives" for outsourcing operations abroad, its
discriminating effect on U.S. producers, and its inappropriateness in
light of advances in international patent cooperation.""
Meanwhile, Microsoft petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari, asking the Court to address the dual questions of
111. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 434 F.3d 1357,
1358 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Lourie, J., joined by Michel, J. and Linn, J., dissenting from denial
of reh'g en banc. Dyk, J., also dissented, but did not join the written dissent.).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1359
115. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1994 WL 1711191. The TRIPs agreement is an international treaty among
World Trade Organization nations for the promotion of international recognition of
intellectual property rights and for combating international trade in counterfeit goods.
116. See Wegner, supra note 105 at 670.
117. Id. at 668.
118. See Farrand, supra note 106 at 1216-18.
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"[w]hether digital software code... may be considered a
'component[] of a patented invention' within the meaning of Section
271(f)(1); and, if so, [w]hether copies of such a 'component[]' made in
a foreign country are 'supplie[d] ... from the United States.""9 The
Solicitor General of the United States submitted an amicus brief
agreeing that the High Court should review this issue and supporting
Microsoft's petition. 12') The Solicitor General believed that, although
software could be a component for purposes of § 271(f), liability
should not extend to copies made overseas. In the Solicitor General's
view, such an application would "improperly extend[] United States
patent law to foreign markets and put[] the United States software
companies at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis their foreign
competitors in foreign markets." 121  The Supreme Court granted
Microsoft's petition and granted certiorari. 122
III. AT&T II, Cardiac Pacemakers, and the Limited Scope of
Section 271(f)
A. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. (AT&T II)
The Supreme Court carefully framed the two issues for
resolution: "First, when, or in what form, does software qualify as a
'component' under § 271(f)?" Second, "[w]ere 'components' of the
foreign-made computers involved in this case 'supplie[d]' by
Microsoft 'from the United States'?" 123 In other words, did the
software supplied by Microsoft and loaded from a golden master disk
to computers overseas constitute a "component" for purposes of
§ 271(f)? The Court further clarified the scope of its rulings by
stating that it was not addressing "whether software in the abstract, or
any other intangible, can ever be a component under § 271(f)," 124 or
whether "a disk shipped from the United States, and used to install
Windows directly on a foreign computer, would ... give rise to
liability under § 271(f) if the disk were removed after installation."l'
119. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (No.
05-1056).
120. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056 (Sept. 29, 2006).
121. Id. at 7.
122. 549 U.S. 991 (2006).
123. AT&T II, 550 U.S. at 447-48.
124. Id. at 452 n.13.
125. Id. at 454 n.14.
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Regarding the first question - when does software become a
component - the Court looked to the text of § 271(f)(1), which
applies to components that are combined to form the patented
invention. The Court held that "[u]ntil [software] is expressed as a
computer-readable 'copy,' e.g., on a CD-ROM, Windows software ...
remains uncombinable... . Abstract software code is an idea without
physical embodiment, and as such, it does not match § 271(f)'s
categorization: 'components' amenable to 'combination."' 126  The
Court analogized software to a blueprint or a set of instructions,
which are outside of the protection of § 271(f).'17 In another analogy,
the Court stated that an unpatented machine for making patented
sprockets would not be considered a "component" of the patented
invention despite its ability to be shipped overseas and used to create
thousands of the patented sprockets outside of the United States.2
The Court thus held that "a copy of Windows, not Windows in the
abstract, qualifies as a 'component' under § 271 (f)." 29
The Court then addressed the next issue: whether components of
the foreign-made computers alleged to infringe AT&T's patent were
"supplied" from the United States. The Court disagreed with the
Federal Circuit's conclusion that "for software 'components,' the act
of copying is subsumed in the act of 'supplying.'",o Citing the text of
the statute, the Court held that "components supplied from the
United States, and not copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability when
combined abroad to form the patented invention at issue.""1 The
Court bolstered its holding by citing the presumption against
territoriality: "[a]ny doubt that Microsoft's conduct falls outside
§ 271(f)'s compass would be resolved by the presumption against
extraterritoriality,.. ."
The ultimate result was that Microsoft was neither liable for
shipping its golden master disk abroad, nor for the computers running
copies of Windows that were installed from copies of those disks
abroad. The Court did not, however, answer whether disks shipped
abroad and directly installed on computers to form the patented
126. Id. at 449.
127. Id. at 450 (citing Pellegrini, Inc., 375 F.3d at 1117-19 (transmission abroad of
instructions for production of patented computer chips not covered by § 271 (f))).
128. 550 U.S. at 451.
129. Id. at 451-52.
130. Id. at 452 (citing A T&TI, 414 F.3d at 1370).
131. Id. at 453.
132. Id. at 454.
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invention would constitute infringement, although Justice Alito
opined in his concurrence that § 271(f) would not apply unless a disk
originating in the United States were permanently installed in a
computer. The Court also declined to answer whether or not an
intangible invention such as a process could have intangible
"components" for purposes of § 271(f). 134
1. Justice Stevens' Dissent in AT&T II
Justice Stevens, the lone dissenting vote, believed that affirming
"the Court of Appeals judgment [was] more faithful to the intent of
the Congress that enacted § 271(f) . .. . "' He reasoned that the "sole
intended use" of the software, like the machine in Deepsouth, was an
infringing use.1 3 ' He was also dubious of the proposition that, while a
disk could be a component, the most important part of that disk -
namely the software code it contains - could not.' He further
analogized between sheet music and the roller of a player piano,
noting that unlike a set of instructions the "software actually cause[d]
infringing conduct to occur. 8
Justice Stevens reached the opposite conclusion from the
majority because he began his analysis from a different perspective.
The majority examined the statutory language and legislative context
and found that they did not speak directly to the facts of the case
because the items that were combined abroad to form the patented
invention were merely copies of the exported items and not the
exported items themselves. The majority thus resolved the matter by
relying upon the presumption against extraterritorial application of
domestic patent laws."' The dissent, on the other hand, looked to the
criticism of the Deepsouth decision that motivated Congress to pass of
§ 271(f), and recognized that Microsoft's position was equivalent even
though it was technically distinguishable. 141' After all, Microsoft was
an American company capitalizing on a highly-educated American
133. 550 U.S. at 462 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[I]f these computers could not run
Windows without inserting and keeping a CD-ROM in the appropriate drive, then the
CD-ROMs might be components of the computer. But that is not the case here.").
134. Id. at 452 n.13.
135. Id. at 462 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 463-64.
137. Id.
138. 550 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. AT&T H1, 550 U.S. at 454 (majority opinion).
140. Id. at 463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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workforce to create an infringing product that was sold abroad with
profits returned to America. Furthermore, the Court's
characteristically narrow reading of the issues left plenty of room for
other software manufacturers to avoid liability by performing an
insubstantial duplication step abroad. Indeed, the result of the
majority opinion duplicated the result of the controversial Deepsouth
decision decades earlier: infringement could easily be avoided by off-
shoring an insignificant final step in the creation of the infringing
products.14' The ultimate result is that patented software, the driving
force of much of the U.S. economy, receives very little protection in
the United States from unauthorized exportation.142
B. Cardiac Pacemakers v. St. Jude
AT&T II explicitly declined to rule regarding the applicability of
§ 271(f) to process patents, but the Federal Circuit took their cue and
revisited Union Carbide,43 which previously held that process patents
could have "components" for purposes of § 271(f). In Cardiac
Pacemakers, the en banc Federal Circuit faced the question of
whether exportation of an apparatus, in this case an implantable
cardioverter defibrillator ("ICD"), designed to perform a patented
process constituted infringement under § 271(f).144 The en banc Court
overruled Union Carbide and held that § 271(f) protection simply did
14
not apply to process patents.
The Court based its ruling on a distinction between a
"component" of a tangible invention as opposed to a "component" of
an intangible invention. "A component of a tangible product, device,
or apparatus is a tangible part of the product, device, or apparatus,
whereas a component of a method or process is a step in that method
or process." 146 In other words, Cardiac Pacemakers' patented process
could have no physical components, and St. Jude Medical's ICD
could not constitute a component of the Cardiac Pacemakers patent.
141. See Mary LaFrance, LaFrance on Software as a Component of a Patented
Invention under Section 271(f), Emerging Issues in Copyright (Mathew Bender &
Company, Inc., 2008) ("As a result of this ruling, infringement liability for supplying
software for overseas use in a patented combination can easily be avoided if the actual
copies of the software used in the combination are made overseas, even if they are copied
from a master copy that was supplied from the United States.").
142. Id.
143. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d 1366.
144. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1359.
145. Id. at 1365.
146. Id. at 1362.
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Consequently, exportation of the lCD could not trigger liability under
§ 271(f). This was in stark contrast to the reasoning in Union
Carbide, which held that a catalyst required to practice the process
patent was a "component" of that process.147
Cardiac Pacemakers next addressed the term "supply" as it
appears in the statute and held that in its ordinary meaning refers to
the "transfer of a physical object[]" and that "[s]upplying an
intangible step is thus a physical impossibility." 148 Based on its
definitions of the words "component" and "supplies" in the statute,
the Court held that "Section 271(f) does not apply to method
patents."149
Judge Newman, the lone dissenting vote of the 12-judge panel,
felt that the term "patented invention" as it is used in § 271(f) should
be given its ordinary meaning and the meaning ascribed to it in every
other section of Title 35, which would necessarily include process
patents.o Judge Newman also surveyed multiple bills that were
introduced to rectify the Deepsouth loophole before the final version
of § 271(f) was adopted. She noted that early bills included specific
language limiting the proposed provision to "components of a
patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter," but that
the specific language was later removed and replaced with the
broadly encompassing term "patented invention.""' Thus, in her
view, Congressional intent to include process patents in the
protection afforded by § 271(f) was clear. 2
Cardiac Pacemakers represented a dramatic reversal from prior
Federal Circuit precedent regarding the possible application of
§ 271(f) to process patents. The en banc Cardiac Pacemakers decision
vacated the prior panel decision' and reached the opposite
conclusion and, perhaps surprisingly, Judge Lourie authored both
147. Union Carbide, 434 F.3d at 1380.
148. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1364.
149. Id. at 1366.
150. Id. at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1370.
152. Id. at 1369-1370.
153. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 303 Fed. Appx. 884 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (holding that § 271(f) applied to process patent claims for purposes of calculating
damages for infringement. The panel found that Union Carbide governed, and that
AT&T I did not compel a different result).
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decisions. The en banc decision also overruled Eolas and Union
Carbide.5
There seemed to be little controversy within the Federal Circuit
prior to the en banc decision. Indeed, there were no dissenting
opinions in either Eolas or Union Carbide, and three of the five
circuit judges who took part in those prior decisions joined the
majority Cardiac Pacemakers opinion; the other two took no part in
deciding Cardiac Pacemakers.' Moreover, the result of Cardiac
Pacemakers was not clearly required under AT&T II, which expressly
refrained from deciding whether an intangible process qualifies as a
"patented invention" under § 271(f).157
There was, however, significant scholarly criticism of the Federal
Circuit decisions as described previously"' as well as strong amicus
curiae support for the Federal Circuit's change in course.' The
Federal Circuit Bar Association and the American Intellectual
Property Law Association jointly submitted a brief arguing four
points against applying § 271(f) to method claims. First, the statutory
language was inconsistent with any reading that encompasses method
claims."" Second, these amici argued that Standard Havens was
correctly decided, that no reported decision disagreed with its
holding, and that leading patent scholars had considered the issue
settled."' Third, Union Carbide erroneously ignored controlling
precedent sub silencio.6 2 Finally, the change of law resulting from
154. Id. at 893.
155. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365.
156. Eolas, 399 F.3d 1325 (heard before Rader, J., Friedman, J., and Plager, J.); Union
Carbide, 425 F.3d 1366 (heard before Mayer, J., Rader, J., and Prost, J.); Cardiac
Pacemakers, 576 F.3d 1348 (part C.2 regarding application of § 271(f) heard before
Michel, J., Newman, J., Mayer, J., Lourie, J., Rader, J., Schall, J., Bryson, J., Gajarsa, J.,
Linn, J., Dyk, J., Prost, J., and Moor, J.).
157. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365; 550 U.S. at 452 n.13.
158. See supra Section (II)(C)(3).
159. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1363 n.4 (noting that of all the amicus briefs
received, all but one supported the conclusion that § 271(f) does not apply to method
patents).
160. Brief for the Fed. Circuit Bar Ass'n and Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n as
Amici Curiae Supporting Cross-Appellants, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical,
Inc., Nos. 2007-1296, 2007-1347 at 5 (April 15, 2009).
161. Id. at 17 (citing Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 6 Sedona
Conf. J. 117, 121 (2005); Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in
Intellectual Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 603, 607 (1997)).
162. Id. at 19 (citing Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (stating that prior panel decisions govern later panel decisions until overturned en
banc)).
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Union Carbide carried a risk of hurting American economic interests
because it will force America's high technology innovators to move
R&D and manufacturing facilities overseas to avoid increased
liability, with a resulting decrease in domestic investment in research,
manufacturing, and distribution.11
The threat to American economic interests was further
illustrated by the signatories of the Cisco Systems amicus brief who
represented some of the largest software and computer companies in
America. 6 4  The brief urged reversal of the Federal Circuit's
application of § 271(f) to process patents, arguing that there was a
risk of negative economic impact from disrupting the settled
expectation of the amici and the public at large.1" Specifically, they
noted that it is a common business arrangement for American
companies to export instructions, materials, recipes, and other
knowledge-exports to off-shore locations where manufacturing takes
place."' An overbroad interpretation of § 271(f) to include process
patents would create potential worldwide infringement allegations for
companies based in the United States that export anything that could
be considered a process step or that could be configured to perform a
process abroad, while their foreign competitors faced no such
threat. 67 Cisco Systems further argued that the presumption against
extraterritoriality militated against interpreting § 271(f) to encompass
process claims."
A third amicus brief submitted by Research in Motion argued
similar points and added that the proper vehicle for preventing use of
a patented invention abroad is foreign patents or, failing that, asking
Congress to amend the patent laws.6
163. Id. at 24.
164. Intel Corp., Apple Inc., Oracle Corp., Microsoft Corp., and Symantec Corp. all
joined in Cisc's amici filing. Brief for Cisco Sys., Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Cross-Appellants, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., Nos. 2007-1296,
2007-1347 at 8-11 (April 15, 2009).
165. Id. at 8, n.1.
166. Id. at 8.
167. Id.
168. Intel Corp., Apple Inc., Oracle Corp., Microsoft Corp., and Symantec Corp. all
joined in Cisc's amici filing. Brief for Cisco Sys., Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Cross-Appellants, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., Nos. 2007-1296,
2007-1347 at 3-7.
169. Brief for Research in Motion, Ltd. as Amici Curiae Supporting Cross-Appellants,
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., Nos. 2007-1296, 2007-1347 at 10-15
(April 15, 2009).
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C. Common Themes
The differences of opinion regarding application of § 271(f) to
software and process patents can be explained at least in part by the
ambiguity in the statutory language and the difficulty of applying the
provision to software patents, which did not become common until
after passage of the provision. When Congress passed § 271(f),
process patents were well-established,'17) but the provision did not
expressly address them or describe how their protection was to be
interpreted. The judicial determination whether to include process
patents in the scope of protection under §271(f) has followed from
Court's evolving interpretation of the statutory language and the
legislative history.' ' With the advent of software patents, courts were
forced to grapple with yet more difficult issues regarding the statute
and the extent of its extra-territorial application. Such issues were
particularly complex in the software field since the novel elements of
the claims were intangible.
One of the guiding principles in construing §271(f) and its
application to software patents has been the well-settled presumption
against extraterritoriality. That presumption, simply stated, is that
Congress's law-making authority is limited to the United States and
its territories, thus extending United States laws to cover acts
occurring in foreign nations has the potential to offend the
sovereignty of those nations. Therefore, unless a statute states so
explicitly, it is presumed that Congress did not intend for it to apply
to acts abroad.'17
1. Section 271(f): Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Intent
Section 271(f) was born from the Supreme Court's much-
criticized statutory interpretation of the basic scope of U.S. patent law
in the infamous Deepsouth case. Deepsouth held that "making" and
"selling" within the United States applied only to a complete,
operable assembly, and not to a substantial assembly that could be
170. Indeed, 35 U.S.C. § 101 had long defined patentable subject matter to include
processes.
171. Compare Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1380, with Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at
1365 (reasoning that "method patents do have 'components,' viz., the steps that comprise
the method, . . . but the steps are not the physical components used in performance of the
method." And that "Section 271(f) further requires that those components be 'supplied."'
But that "[s]upplying an intangible step is ... a physical impossibility," thus, "Section
271(f) does not apply to method patents.").
172. Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism,
37 Va. J. Int'l L. 505, 510-11 (1997).
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easily completed abroad.M This decision permitted companies to
circumvent the protection afforded by combination patents by off-
shoring insignificant assembly steps.174 Congress passed § 271(f) in
direct response to Deepsouth to make exportation of a substantial
assembly, or of merely a key component that has no substantial non-
infringing use, an infringing act. 1 7 Courts had no difficulty applying
the new provision until faced with the issues of whether "patented
invention" included processes, and whether software, in the abstract
or on a disk, could be a "component." 76
Patented processes were initially held to be outside of the
purview of § 271(f) by Standard Havens.177 If there was any detailed
statutory interpretation supporting that decision, the court made no
mention of it in its brief discussion. The court summarily dismissed
the application of § 271(f) to the sale abroad of an unpatented
machine whose sole use was performing a patented method.' 17 Union
Carbide reached the opposite conclusion from Standard Havens,
based in part on the holdings of two intervening cases, Eolas and
AT&T I. Union Carbide interpreted the terms "component" and
"patented invention" in § 271(f) to have broad meaning that included
process patents and physical items used in performing those
processes. ' Union Carbide was then contradicted by Cardiac
Pacemakers, which held that the term "components" in the context of
a process patent meant "the steps that comprise the method," "o and
that "steps are not the physical components used in performance of
the method.""' The court then interpreted the statutory term
"supplied" and found that "[s]upplying an intangible step is thus a
173. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 532.
174. Id. at 533 (Blackmun, J. dissenting); Kerr, supra note 41 at 920-21.
175. H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. § 101 (1984).
176. See, e.g., Smith Int'l, 229 U.S.P.Q. 81 (applying § 271(f) to a patent for drill bits for
oil exploration); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d at 320 ("There is no
limitation in the statute excluding protection for chemical composition inventions.");
Aerogroup, 955 F. Supp at 232 (holding that the language of § 271(f)(1) "by its terms does
not apply to the patent at issue here, which has no 'component parts' but is rather a design
patent for a shoe sole.").
177. Standard Havens, 953 F.2d at 1374.
178. Id.
179. Union Carbide, 425 F.3d at 1380.
180. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1363.
181. Id. at 1364.
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physical impossibility,..." 182  Through this interpretation the court
completely removed process patents from the protection of § 271(f).
Cardiac Pacemakers went further, however, and compared
§ 271(f) to § 271(c), after which § 271(f)(2) was modeled. Section
271(c) distinguishes between a "component of a patented machine,
manufacture, combination, or composition" and a "material or
apparatus for use in practicing a patented process."1 1 The court
interpreted this distinction as a reflection of Congressional
recognition of the difference between machines and methods and
Congress's choice not to include methods within the protections of
§ 271(f).18 4 Finally, the court turned to Congressional intent in passing
the statute, noting that it was passed with the purpose of closing the
Deepsouth loophole, which involved only an apparatus patent, and
that the legislative history simply made no reference to process
patents."
The application of § 271(f) to software inventions similarly rested
on courts' interpretation of the terms "component," "supplied," and
"patented invention." Imagexpo, the first case to deal with the issue
of whether a software disk was a "component" for purposes of
§ 271(f) held that it was."' The court agreed with the plaintiff's
position that the golden master disk "actually involves an
information- or code-base which becomes an integral ingredient in
the finished computer product.... [T]he functional nucleus of the
finished computer product is driven by the code, which is transmitted
through the 'golden master."'
Eolas went even further. Eolas held that § 271(f) used the
"broad and inclusive" term "patented invention," which, as defined
by § 101 included "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture
or composition of matter."... The court found that without the
software code, "the invention would not work and thus would not
even qualify as new and 'useful.' Thus, the software code on the
golden master disk is not only a component, it is probably the key
part of this patented invention."'" Finally, the court cited the
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1363.
184. Id. at 1363-64.
185. Id.
186. 299 F. Supp. 2d at 553.
187. Id.
188. 399 F.3d at 1338-39.
189. Id. at 1339.
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legislative history of § 271(f) and found nothing in the record
indicating the statute was limited to physical components. 9
Of course Eolas was mostly overruled by AT&T II, which held
that only an installable copy of software (but not a master disk) could
be a "component," and that only installable copies could be
"supplied" from the United States."' The AT&T II Court held that
abstract software code was "an idea without physical embodiment,
and as such, it does not match § 271(f)'s categorization: 'components'
amenable to 'combination. ""' However, the decision stopped short
of the formalistic interpretation found in Justice Alito's concurrence,
which suggested a software disk could only qualify as a component if
the disk were required to remain installed in the computer for the
computer to perform the patented function. 9
The Court similarly believed that only the software disk intended
for installation onto a computer, and not a master disk, could be
"supplied" from the United States.194 AT&T II also considered the
purpose of the statute, and although recognizing that technological
progress had led to a new "gap" in patent protection, the majority
believed any adjustment to the scope of patent protection "should be
made after focused legislative consideration, and not by the Judiciary
forecasting Congress' likely disposition."'
Following these decisions, § 271(f), which does not on its face
distinguish between process and device patents, or by component
types, is nevertheless applied differently depending on the
technological field at issue. Such differing treatment appears to be at
odds with the international agreements governing patent protection.
For example, the TRIPs Agreement adopted by the United States in
1994 sets minimum standards for intellectual property protection
among member nations.'" TRIPs states that "patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all
fields of technology, . . ."
This narrow view of the protection afforded by § 271(f) also
appears inconsistent with the recent Supreme Court decision Quanta
190. Id. at 1340.
191. 550 U.S. at 451-53.
192. Id. at 449.
193. Id. at 462 (Alito, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 454 (majority opinion).
195. Id. at 458-59.
196. See Wegner, supra note 105 at 667.
197. TRIPs Art. 27(1).
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Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. '" In Quanta, the Supreme
Court explained in the context of the patent exhaustion doctrine...
that "methods ... may be embodied in a product" and that
"precedent[] do[es] not differentiate transactions involving
embodiments of patented methods or processes from those involving
patented apparatuses or materials." 200 However, this is precisely the
result of AT&T II and Cardiac Pacemakers. Quanta further
explained why inconsistent application of the law to apparatus and
process patents would result in the circumvention of the patent
exhaustion doctrine for nearly any patented item through the artifice
of clever patent drafting.2 1
The combined holdings of AT&T II and Cardiac Pacemakers
arguably allow for a similar loophole: to avoid infringing a software
patent under § 271(f), a party appears to have the opportunity to
simply undertake a business practice in which software code, in
whatever medium transmitted, is copied to another medium prior to
installation or execution.20 As far as process patents are concerned,
no special action is required since process patents are not protected
by § 271(f). 203 The facts of Quanta did not involve foreign use,
198. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2109, 2117 (2008).
199. The patent exhaustion doctrine, also called the first sale doctrine, "provides that
the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item."
Quanta, 128 S.Ct. at 2115. In other words, once a patented article has been sold, the
patentee has reaped the benefit of his or her exclusive right, which is thus exhausted; the
patentee has no further rights against a subsequent third party's ownership or use of the
article.
200. Quanta, 128 S.Ct. at 2117. But see NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, LTD., 418
F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a patent directed to a communication system
could be infringed in the United States even though an element of that system was in
Canada; but holding simultaneously that a process patent could not be infringed in the
United States if a step of that method was performed abroad.)
201. Id. at 2118 ("By characterizing their claims as method instead of apparatus claims,
or including a method claim for the machine's patented method of performing its task, a
patent drafter could shield practically any patented item from exhaustion.").
202. AT&T II, 550 U.S. at 453 ("[T]he very components supplied from the United
States, and not copies thereof, trigger § 271 (f) liability when combined abroad to form the
patented invention at issue."). See also LaFrance, supra note 141 ("As a result of [AT&T
II], infringement liability for supplying software for overseas use in a patented
combination can easily be avoided if the actual copies of the software used in the
combination are made overseas, even if they are copied from a master copy that was
supplied from the United States.").
203. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365. See also Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta
Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that "a party that sells or
offers to sell software containing instructions to perform a patented method does not
infringe the patent under § 271(a).").
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however, so despite Quanta's holding that patented apparatuses and
processes are equal under the principle of exhaustion, the Court
viewed the presumption against extraterritorial application of
American laws as overriding.2 4
2. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
When courts are unsure of whether Congress intended for a
statute to govern acts occurring abroad, they apply a presumption
against extraterritorial effect.205 This presumption is long-established
and has been recognized in the application of patent laws since the
mid 19th century.26
There are two important justifications for the presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws: The first is comity;
i.e., the mutual respect for the sovereignty and laws of other
countries.207 The second is separation of powers. 208 Extension by the
judiciary of U.S. laws to acts occurring in foreign countries interferes
with the political branches' prerogative to reach international
agreements for the protection of intellectual property.2 09
The presumption against extraterritoriality is so strong that it can
be invoked like a trump card to resolve any controversy in the
application of a statute. 210 The problem with applying the pre-
sumption in the case of § 271(f), however, is that § 271(f) was drafted
204. Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365.
205. Foley Bros., Inc., v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
206. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1857).
207. See Farrand, supra note 106 at 1221. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1895) ("'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."). See
generally Robert A. McFarlane, The Effect of International Comity on the Application of
the Attorney-Client Privilege and Foreign Privilege Laws in U.S. Patent Litigation, 23
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J., 667 (2007) (reviewing application of
comity principles to additional issues in patent litigation).
208. Bradley, supra note 172 at 562.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., AT&T II., 550 U.S. at 454 (Any doubt that Microsoft's conduct falls
outside § 271(f)'s compass would be resolved by the presumption against
extraterritoriality, .... "); Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531 ("Our patent system makes no claim
to extraterritorial effect; . . ."); Brown, 60 U.S. at 195 ("[T]hese acts of Congress do not,
and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States."); Cardiac
Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365 ("Any ambiguity as to Congress's intent in enacting Section
271 (f) is further resolved by the presumption against extra-territoriality.").
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with extraterritorial application specifically in mind; namely, it was
drafted to capture acts of infringement that the Supreme Court felt
were outside of the territorial purview of §§ 271(a), (b), and (c). In
Deepsouth, applying the presumption seemed appropriate: an
infringing product never existed in the United States. Cases
construing § 271(f), however, arguably have a weaker legal
foundation. To be clear, the question is not whether to apply § 271(f)
to acts occurring abroad - that is its only application; nor has the issue
been the substantiality of the domestic acts, i.e., how much or how
little domestic activity satisfies § 271(f). Rather, a central issue has
been whether to apply § 271(f) differently to patented inventions of
different types, namely process and device patents.2 In other words,
the presumption against extraterritoriality has been used to justify
granting or withholding the protections of a statute with intended
extraterritorial effect based on the nature of the underlying invention.
Such distinctions invite exactly the type of gaming feared by Justice
Thomas in Quanta. But perhaps the real purpose of these rulings
was to limit, as has been suggested, the application of § 271(f) as
much as possible.214
IV. Implications and Suggestions
A. Different Protections for Tangible and Intangible Inventions
The most striking result of AT&T II and Cardiac Pacemakers is
the significant limitation of the protections available to software
inventions under § 271(f). While AT&T II does not completely
preclude liability under § 271(f) for software inventions patented as
apparatuses, the precautions necessary to avoid infringement liability
may be trivial. It seems that a would-be infringer need only transmit
the software electronically or duplicate it abroad to be installed on
individual computers. Cardiac Pacemakers arguably precludes
211. See H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. § 101 (1984).
212. See, e.g., AT&TII, 550 U.S. 437; Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d 1348.
213. Quanta, 128 S.Ct. at 2117-18 ("By characterizing their claims as method instead of
apparatus claims, or including a method claim for the machine's patented method of
performing its task, a patent drafter could shield practically any patented item from
exhaustion.").
214. Farrand, supra note 106 at 1291.
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liability for software inventions patented as processes, as well as any
*215
other process invention.
The resulting situation is one strikingly similar to that following
the Deepsouth decision: An American competitor can find a
commercially successful software product, recreate the software from
the patent disclosure using an educated American workforce working
in the United States, and sell the software in countries where a patent
has not been filed or is not worth pursuing. The economic
significance of this state of affairs is evidenced by the enormous
damages ruling in Eolas: a total of $521 million, $333 million of which
were based on foreign sales.2 6
B. Should § 271 be Amended?
The judicial controversy surrounding the appropriate application
of § 271(f) and the high stakes involved in the software export market
give rise to an obvious question: should Congress amend § 271?
Further, if a Congressional response is appropriate, what should that
response be? If Congress feels that an inequitable gap similar to the
one created by Deepsouth now exists with respect to software
inventions, they could add a provision that would extend protection
to software inventions similar to that granted to other patents by
§ 271(f). The alternative would be to repeal § 271(f) to eliminate the
special protection given to machine patents and balance the
protections afforded to tangible and intangible inventions.2 1
1. Should Congress Add a Provision to § 271 to Extend Protection to
Software?
The state of the law following A T& T II and Cardiac Pacemakers
is similar to the state of the law after Deepsouth: the courts have left
an opening in the patent law for American companies to profit by
copying the patented products of other American companies and
selling them abroad. There is one difference, however. Ratification
of the TRIPs agreement, which sets forth standards for minimum
patent protection in member countries, has led to the creation of
patent protection in foreign countries that was not available at the
215. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365 ("Section 271 (f) does not apply to
method patents."); and Sheldon, supra note 65 at § 14:14.2[B] (describing the format for
claiming software inventions using process claims).
216. See Morico, supra note 109 at 23.
217. See Farrand, supra note 106 at 1215.
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time of Deepsouth.218 For example, with regard to patented products,
TRIPs states that member nations must "prevent third parties not
having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering
for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product;" 219 and,
for patented processes, "prevent third parties not having the owner's
consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using,
offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the
product obtained directly by that process." 22() Nevertheless, in
scenarios like the ones leading up to AT&T II and Cardiac
Pacemakers, an American patentee wishing to enforce its patents
against an American competitor may be forced to bring legal action
* 221in a foreign court, and quite possibly many foreign courts.
Congress could close this gap by amending § 271(f) to replace the
broad but ambiguous phrase "patented invention" with the equally
broad but more explicit language from § 271(c): "patented machine,
manufacture, combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus
for use in practicing a patented process." In addition, language could
be added to extend the language in § 271(f)(2) that protects a
component "that is especially made or especially adapted for use in
the invention" to include not just a computer disk containing software
code, but the software code itself, which Justice Stevens' referred to
as "the most important ingredient of that component." 222 Based on
industry opposition to expanding the protections of § 271(f), 223
218. See Wegner, supra note 105 at 667.
219. TRIPs Art. 28 (1)(a) (footnote omitted).
220. Id. at § (1)(b).
221. While the TRIPs agreement calls for restrictions on unauthorized importation of
patented products or the products of patent processes, TRIPs does not require any
restrictions on exportation. See TRIPs Art. 28.
222. AT&T II, 550 U.S. at 464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. See, e.g., Brief for Cisco Sys., Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Cross-
Appellants, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., Nos. 2007-1296, 2007-1347
at 1-3 (April 15, 2009) (arguing that applying § 271(f) to process inventions would create
worldwide infringement liability for U.S. companies who export anything that could
properly be considered a process step or something that could be configured to perform
processes abroad, while foreign competitors face no such liability); Brief for the Business
Software Alliance as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Microsoft Crop. v. AT&T
Corp., No. 05-1056 at 5 (Dec 15, 2006) (arguing that the indefinite liability under an
interpretation of § 271 (f) that includes software puts American inventors at a disadvantage
relative to foreign inventors); Brief for the Software and Information Indus. Ass'n. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Microsoft Crop. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056 at
(Dec 15, 2006) (stating that the decision of the Federal Circuit to apply 271 (f) to software
master disks upset investments and plans made in reasonable reliance on previously
settled law that limited extraterritorial application of United States Patent law to the
narrow exception created by § 271(f)).
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however, expanding the application of § 271(f) to include software
seems unlikely.
2. Should Congress Repeal §271(f)?
If consistency in protection across different patent categories and
technologies is desired, an alternative to amending § 271(f) is to
repeal it altogether.224 While one could say that § 271(f) prevents
inequitable conduct by American companies, the provision arguably
disadvantages American companies because it does not and cannot
prevent the same conduct on the part of foreign companies.
Furthermore, since the passage of § 271(f) in 1984, an arguably better
vehicle for the protection of intellectual property abroad is strong
221
enforcement of the TRIPs agreement.
Since any legislative action would be driven by its intended
beneficiaries, it is important to gauge the effect of any proposed
amendment on American technology companies. Based on the
amicus briefs filed in the Cardiac Pacemakers and AT&T II cases,
American software companies and high-tech manufacturers seem to
oppose expansion of § 271(f). 227 Indeed, all but one amicus brief filed
in Cardiac Pacemakers were against extension of § 271(f) protection
224. For a persuasive argument, see Farrand, supra note 106 at 1215.
225. See id. at 1266.
226. See Wegner, supra note 105 at 670.
227. See, e.g., Brief for Cisco Sys., Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Cross-
Appellants, Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., Nos. 2007-1296, 2007-1347
at 1-3 (April 15, 2009) (arguing that applying § 271(f) to process inventions would create
worldwide infringement liability for U.S. companies who export anything that could
properly be considered a process step or something that could be configured to perform
processes abroad, while foreign competitors face no such liability); Brief for the Business
Software Alliance as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Microsoft Crop. v. AT&T
Corp., No. 05-1056 at 5 (Dec 15, 2006) (arguing that the indefinite liability under an
interpretation of § 271(f) that includes software puts American inventors at a disadvantage
relative to foreign inventors); Brief for the Software and Information Indus. Ass'n. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Microsoft Crop. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056 at
(Dec 15, 2006) (stating that the decision of the Federal Circuit to apply 271(f) to software
master disks upset investments and plans made in reasonable reliance on previously
settled law that limited extraterritorial application of United States Patent law to the
narrow exception created by § 271(f)); but see Brief for Philips Corporation and Philips
Electronics North America Corporation as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent,
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056 at 7-9 (Jan. 23, 2007) (arguing that
withholding application § 271(f) to software code hurts domestic electronics
manufacturers because of the trend for hardware to become more and more generic and
multiuse, while their specialized functions are embodied in software. For such products,
liability for exportation can be avoided by installing the software abroad, since exportation
of the generic hardware cannot trigger § 271(f)).
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to process patents. In AT&T II, eleven amicus briefs favored
Microsoft's position that § 271(f) should not apply to software master
disks, three briefs favored AT&T's position that software in any form
should be protected, and four briefs supported neither party. 29 Only
one of the parties supporting AT&T was a manufacturer, the rest
were universities, a venture capital firm, and a think tank. Parties
supporting Microsoft included the United States, Intel Corp.,
Amazon.com, Yahoo! Inc., Eli Lilly, Autodesk, and several software
industry associations.""
Several of the briefs supporting Microsoft described the harm to
American economic interests that would result from extending
§ 271(f) to software in any form .231 A brief filed by the American
Intellectual Property Law Association in favor of neither party
further highlighted the economic ramifications of an expansive
reading of § 271(f):
Under the Federal Circuit's interpretation of section 271(f),
once a company creates software in the United States, it could
not send the software to a foreign country for replication
without potentially incurring liability for infringement of a
United States patent. This would create a strong incentive for
software companies to relocate development facilities - and
jobs - outside of the United States.
On the other hand, the amicus brief for Philips Corporation
argued that limiting § 271(f) favors software companies over
228. See Cardiac Pacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1363.
229. See AT&TI ,550 U.S. 437.
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., Brief for the Business Software Alliance as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Microsoft Crop. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056 at 10 (Dec 15, 2006) ("At the
extreme, the decision below threatens to recalibrate the decisions of American companies
on where they do their research and innovation by attaching substantial and unpredictable
risk of liability to research done at home in the United States, while excluding from all
such risks innovation done outside of United States territory."); Brief for the Software and
Information Indus. Ass'n. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Microsoft Crop. v.
AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056 at 18 (Dec 15, 2006) ("By generating immediate, yet
congressionally unintended, legal exposure for United States companies, the decision may
dissuade information -based companies from maintaining their operations in the United
States, as doing so will burden them with risks and a competitive disadvantage relative to
foreign companies.").
232. Brief for the Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Microsoft Crop. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056 at 18 (Dec 15, 2006).
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electronics manufacturers. 233 Philips noted that the marginal cost for
producing software is zero, while software becomes more valuable the
more widely it is used, even if the greater use is the result of piracy.24
The disadvantage to electronics manufacturers results from the trend
of electronics hardware becoming more and more generic, while
functionality is controlled by specialized software. In such a case, it is
quite easy to build the hardware here or abroad and safely avoid
infringement by installing the specialized software outside of the
United States.25 If § 271(f) were to be repealed outright, it would
eliminate the disadvantage of electronics manufacturers relative to
software companies as well as eliminate the incentive for American
manufacturers of all types to move their R&D and operations abroad.
However, Congress passed § 271(f) to protect the interests of
American manufacturers and it cannot be assumed that American
manufacturers of tangible goods would today wish to give up those
special protections."'
V. Conclusion
Courts' varying application of § 271(f) to patented inventions of
different types has led to protections that are inconsistent across
different technologies. However, differing treatments for different
kinds of technology may be appropriate in light of their distinct
business realities, and in fact, if the balance of amicus briefs in
AT&T II and Cardiac Pacemakers is any indication, it seems as
though the weight of commercial industry is against expanding the
protections of § 271(f). Furthermore, the business landscape today
233. Brief for Philips Corporation and Philips Electronics North America Corporation
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., No. 05-1056
at 7-9 (Jan. 23, 2007).
234. Id. at 22-25.
235. Id. at 7-9.
236. See id.
237. For example, software companies may actually benefit from piracy due to the
network effect, which results in software becoming more valuable as it attracts more users,
even if many of those users do not pay. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New
Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 928 (2001) ("[C]omputer programs tend to be more
valuable the more people use them because training, support by IT personnel, and
standardization of equipment and procedures are facilitated."); Richard A. Posner, Do We
Have Too Many Intellectual Property Rights?, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 173, 179
(2005) ("If only a few of the people who copied the [operating system] would have bought
it, the producer actually benefits from the piracy because the more people who use the
operating system the greater the market for applications programs that work with it, and
he may produce such programs as well as the operating system.").
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versus 1984 when § 271(f) was passed may be quite different for all
companies. Large companies are perhaps more fearful of litigation
and enormous infringement verdicts than they are of infringing
competitors. Given the alternative solutions of either amending
§ 271(f) to level the playing field among different industries, or
repealing it altogether in light of much improved international patent
protections, the best course may in fact be the one that courts have
chosen: a conservative and narrow reading of the statute that
excludes processes, and offers only limited protection to software.
238. The median patent damages award for years 1982-1989 was about $800,000. The
median award for years 2000-2006 was $3.8 million. While this data does not include
settlements, settlement amounts are based on expected damages awards, thus they can be
expected to roughly follow the same trend. Shawn McGrath and Kathleen M. Kedrwoski,
Trends in Patent Damages, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LITIGATION,
(Nov. 2007), available at http://www.docs.piausa.org/ABA/07-06-01-ABA-Report-On-
Patent- Damages.pdf at 5.
